Being no one : the self-model theory of subjectivity /
by
Metzinger, Thomas
.
Material type: 
BookSeries: A Bradford book: Publisher: Cambridge Mass. [etc.] : The MIT Press, cop. 2003Description: XII, 699 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.ISBN: 0262134179.Subject(s): soi -- subjectivité -- * philosophie analytiqueMeSH subject(s): Consciousness | Models, Psychological | Self Concept | Cognition | Psychological Theory | Motivation | Neuropsychology | MonographSummary: This book is about consciousness, the phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective. Its a main thesis is that no such things as selves exist in the world: Nobody ever was or had a self. All that ever existed were conscious self-models that could not be recognized as models. The author offers a representationalist and functionalist analysis of what a consciously experienced forst-person perspective is. This book is also, and in a number of ways, an experiment. The reader will find conceptual tool kits and new metaphors, case studies of unusual states of mind, as well as multilevel constraints for a comprehensive theory of consciousness. The author introduces two theoretical entities--the "phenomenal self-model" and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality relation"--that may form the decisive conceptual link between first-person and third-person approaches to the conscious mind and between consciousness research in the humanities and in the sciences.
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Status | Date due |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CDU 155 (Browse shelf) | Available | |||
| Empruntable | IST, Institut universitaire romand de santé au travail; Bibliothèque Bibliothèque | IST BF-311-Met-2003 (Browse shelf) | Available |
Bibliogr.
vdist-/07.2013 This book is about consciousness, the phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective. Its a main thesis is that no such things as selves exist in the world: Nobody ever was or had a self. All that ever existed were conscious self-models that could not be recognized as models. The author offers a representationalist and functionalist analysis of what a consciously experienced forst-person perspective is. This book is also, and in a number of ways, an experiment. The reader will find conceptual tool kits and new metaphors, case studies of unusual states of mind, as well as multilevel constraints for a comprehensive theory of consciousness. The author introduces two theoretical entities--the "phenomenal self-model" and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality relation"--that may form the decisive conceptual link between first-person and third-person approaches to the conscious mind and between consciousness research in the humanities and in the sciences.