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Being no one : the self-model theory of subjectivity /

by Metzinger, Thomas.
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookSeries: A Bradford book: Publisher: Cambridge Mass. [etc.] : The MIT Press, cop. 2003Description: XII, 699 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.ISBN: 0262134179.Subject(s): soi -- subjectivité -- * philosophie analytiqueMeSH subject(s): Consciousness | Models, Psychological | Self Concept | Cognition | Psychological Theory | Motivation | Neuropsychology | MonographSummary: This book is about consciousness, the phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective. Its a main thesis is that no such things as selves exist in the world: Nobody ever was or had a self. All that ever existed were conscious self-models that could not be recognized as models. The author offers a representationalist and functionalist analysis of what a consciously experienced forst-person perspective is. This book is also, and in a number of ways, an experiment. The reader will find conceptual tool kits and new metaphors, case studies of unusual states of mind, as well as multilevel constraints for a comprehensive theory of consciousness. The author introduces two theoretical entities--the "phenomenal self-model" and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality relation"--that may form the decisive conceptual link between first-person and third-person approaches to the conscious mind and between consciousness research in the humanities and in the sciences.
Item type Current location Call number Status Date due
CDU 155 (Browse shelf) Available
Empruntable IST, Institut universitaire romand de santé au travail; Bibliothèque
Bibliothèque
IST BF-311-Met-2003 (Browse shelf) Available

Bibliogr.

vdist-/07.2013 This book is about consciousness, the phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective. Its a main thesis is that no such things as selves exist in the world: Nobody ever was or had a self. All that ever existed were conscious self-models that could not be recognized as models. The author offers a representationalist and functionalist analysis of what a consciously experienced forst-person perspective is. This book is also, and in a number of ways, an experiment. The reader will find conceptual tool kits and new metaphors, case studies of unusual states of mind, as well as multilevel constraints for a comprehensive theory of consciousness. The author introduces two theoretical entities--the "phenomenal self-model" and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality relation"--that may form the decisive conceptual link between first-person and third-person approaches to the conscious mind and between consciousness research in the humanities and in the sciences.